Time Travel Research © 1998 Cetin BAL -
GSM:+90 05366063183 -Turkey/Denizli
It was exploded, so the story goes, one day after the American plutonium
bomb, "Fat Man", exploded over Nagasaki, i.e., on August 10, 1945.
The war, in other words, depending on Hirohito's decision, could have "gone
nuclear". By that time, of course it would have done Japan no good to
prolong it, with no viable means of delivery of an atomic weapon to any
worthwhile strategic American targets. The Emperor stood his ministers down.
Finally, a curious fact, one of those obvious things that one lends to
overlook unless attention is drawn to it: the atomic bomb test that took
place at the Trinity site in New Mexico was a test of America's implosion-plutonium
bomb, a test needed to see if the concept would actually work. It did, and
magnificently. But what is immensely significant - a fact missing from
almost all mainstream literature on the subject since the end of the war -
is that the uranium bomb with its apparatus of a cannon shooting the
critical mass of uranium together, the bomb that was actually first used in
war, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, was never tested. As German author
Friedrich Georg notes, this tears a rather gaping hole in the Allied Legend:
Also another question is of great importance: Why was the uranium bomb of
the USA, unlike the plutonium bomb, not tested prior to being hurled on
Japan? Militarily this would appear to be extremely dangerous.... Did the
Americans simply forget to test it, or did others already do it for them?
The Allied Legend accounts for this in various ways, some ingenious, some
not so ingenious, but basically they boil down to the assertion that it was
never tested because it did not need to be, so confident were Allied
engineers that it would work. So we have been asked to believe, by the post-war
Allied spin, that the American military dropped an atomic bomb of untested
design, based on concepts of physics that were very new and themselves very
untested, on an enemy city, an enemy also known to be working on acquiring
the atomic bomb as well!
These facts raise a speculative possibility. It is well-known that the
announcement by nuclear chemist Otto Hahn of his discovery of nuclear
fission did not occur until after the Munich conference and the surrender of
the Sudetenland to the Third Reich by Chamberlain and Daladier. But might
the reality have been something different? Might, in fact, the discovery of
fission taken place before the conference, and its results withheld by the
Reich until after Europe's only uranium supply was firmly in Nazi hands? It
is perhaps significant that Adolf Hitler was prepared to go to war over the
In any case, before we investigate the question of the technology
available to the Germans, we must first answer the question of why they
apparently concentrated almost exclusively on
15. Hydrick, op. cit., p. 3. Obviously, Hydrick himself does not appear
ready to go all the way and acknowledge that the Germans actually
successfully tested an atom bomb before its American Manhattan project
counterpart produced and tested one.
obtaining a uranium atom bomb in their program. After all, the American
Manhattan Project had elected to pursue both a uranium and a plutonium bomb.
The theoretical possibility of plutonium bombs - "element 94" as it was
officially called in German documents of the period - was certainly known to
the Nazis. And, as the early 1942 memorandum to the Heereswaffenamt
also makes clear, the Germans also knew that this element could only be
synthesized in an atomic reactor.
So why did they apparently concentrate only on a uranium bomb and isotope
separation and enrichment almost exclusively? With the destruction of the
Norwegian heavy water plant at Ryukon in 1942 by Allied commandos, and
German failures in obtaining sufficient purity of graphite for use as a
moderator in a reactor, the only other moderator available to them - heavy
water - was now in critically short supply. Thus, according to the Legend, a
functioning reactor leading to a critical mass supply of "element 94" was
not feasible to them in the projected span of the war.
But let us, for a moment, assume that the Allied commando raid had not
taken place. The German failures with graphite moderated reactors were
already a matter of record, and it was obvious to them that there were
significant technological and engineering hurdles to be surmounted before a
reactor came into production. On the other hand, the Germans already had the
necessary technology to enrich U-235 for a bomb, and thus uranium enrichment
constituted the best, most direct, and technologically feasible route to the
acquisition of a bomb within the expected span of the war for the Germans.
More on that technology in a moment.
One now has to deal with yet another component of the Allied Legend.
American progress in the plutonium bomb, from the moment Fermi successfully
completed and tested a functioning reactor in the squash court at the
University of Chicago, appeared to be running fairly smoothly, until fairly
late in the war, when it was discovered that in order to make a bomb from
plutonium, the critical mass would have to be assembled much faster than any
existing Allied fuse technologies could accomplish. Moreover, there was so
little margin of error, since the fuses in an implosion device
would have to fire as close to simultaneously as possible,
that Allied engineers began to despair of making a plutonium bomb work.
Thus one is confronted with a rather interesting scientific picture, one
directly in contradiction to the traditional history of the bomb. If the
Germans indeed had a successful and large scale uranium enrichment project
running ca. 1941-1944, and if their bomb project was devoted almost
exclusively on acquiring a uranium atom bomb, and if at the same time Allied
engineers were coming to realize the problems inherent in plutonium bomb
design, then this means, in one respect at least, that the Germans have not
wasted time or effort" on what is admittedly a more difficult task, namely,
the plutonium bomb. As we shall see in the next chapter, this fact gives
rise to serious doubts about the state of "success" in the Manhattan Project
in late 1944 and early 1945.
So what were the actual technologies available to Nazi Germany for
isotope enrichment and separation, and how did it compare to similar
technologies employed at Oak Ridge for efficiency and output?
Difficult as it seems to accept, the fact of the matter is that Nazi
Germany had "at least five, and possibly as many as seven, serious isotope
separation development programs underway." One of these, an "isotope
sluice" developed by Drs. Bagge and Korsching, two of the scientists
interred at Farm Hall, was brought to such a state of efficiency by mid-1944
that a single pass of uranium through it would enrich it to four times that
produced by a single pass through the gaseous diffusion gates at Oak Ridge!
If the stocks of weapons grade uranium ca. late 1944 - early 1945 were
about half of what they needed to be after two years of research and
production, and if this in turn was the cause of Senator Byrnes' concern,
how then did the Manhattan Project acquire the large remaining amount or
uranium 235 needed in the few months from March to the dropping of the
Little Boy bomb on Hiroshima in August, only five months away?
How did it accomplish this feat, if in feet after some three years of
production it had only produced less than half of the needed supply of
critical mass weapons grade uranium? Where did its missing uranium 235
come from? And how did it solve the pressing problem of the fuses for a
Of course the answer if that if the Manhattan Project was incapable
of producing enough enriched uranium in that short amount of time-months
rather than years - then its stocks had to have been supplemented from
external sources, and there is only one viable place with the necessary
technology to enrich uranium on that scale, as seen in the previous
chapter. That source was Nazi Germany. But the Manhattan Project
is not the only atom bomb project with some missing uranium.
Germany too appears to have suffered the "missing uranium syndrome"
in the final days prior to and immediately after the end of the war. But
the problem in Germany's case is that the missing uranium it not a few
tens of kilos, but several hundred tons. At this juncture, it is worth
citing Carter Hydrick's excellent research at length, in order to
exhibit the full ramifications of this problem:
From June of 1940 to the end of the war, Germany seized 3,500 tons of
uranium compounds from Belgium - almost three times the amount Groves
had purchased.... and stored it in salt mines in Strassfurt, Germany.
Groves brags that on 17 April, 1945, as the war was winding down, Alsos
recovered some 1,100 tons of uranium ore from Strassfurt and an
additional 31 tons in Toulouse, France ..... And he claims that the
amount recovered was all that Germany had ever held, asserting,
therefore, that Germany had never had enough raw material
5. Hydrick, op. cit, p. 13.
to process the uranium either for a plutonium reactor pile or through
magnetic separation techniques. Obviously, if Strassfurt once held 3,500
tons and only 1,130 were recovered, some 2,370 tons of uranium ore was
unaccounted for - still twice the amount the Manhattan Project possessed
and is assumed to have used throughout its entire wartime effort.... The
material has not been accounted for to this day....
1. The "Molecular" Bomb: The Hydrogen Bomb?
The idea of a "Superbomb" was first patented prior to World War Two
in Austria, and a modification of the idea was patented in Germany in
1943. Its inventor, Dr. Karl Nowak, explained the reason for his
invention as being to create a superbomb without the radioactive fallout
effects that were evident from atomic and thermonuclear explosions!
In other words, the Nazis were already looking past the thermonuclear
age toward the creation of second and third generation weapons systems
that would give the same offensive and strategic "punch" but
without the side effects! In theory, the bomb is workable, but was way
beyond the technological capabilities of Germany, or any other power, in
that time period. Basically, the idea was to create a state of matter in
which, through ultra-low temperatures approaching absolute zero, matter
would be super-compressed. The idea was then to detonate this material,
subjecting it to sudden stress and heat, to create a sudden and massive
expansion and explosion, and therewith, an enormous, H-bomb sized blast.
Thus, there may have been a basis in actual German secret research for
the incredible claim of the Japanese military attaché in Stockholm's
1943 report to Tokyo that the Germans were investigating the properties
of super-dense matter for weaponization.
27.It should be recalled that Dr. Edward Teller actually first
thought of, and proposed to the Allies, the hydrogen bomb in 1944.
28. German patent 905.847, March 16, 1943, cited in Mayer and Mehner,
Hitler und die, Bombe", p. 159.
29.Ibid., p. 159.
30.Ibid., p. 158.
17. Ibid, p. 367.
18. It should be noted that Hydrick does not maintain that the Nazis
were successful in building and successfully testing an atom bomb during
the war, much less of trying to transport blueprints or a functioning
model to the Japanese in the U-234. I maintain this possibility on the
basis of the research presented in part one, and on the corroborative
evidence presented by Robert Wilcox in his Japan's Secret War,
that the Japanese successfully tested a bomb shortly after the bombing
of Nagasaki. An infusion of actual bomb designs to the Japanese by the
Germans late in the war might account for their relatively quick ability
to develop and test a weapon under such difficult circumstances as the
Japanese economy and military were in at the end of the war. However, it
should also be noted that the Japanese had independently designed their
own workable bomb along similar lines as existing German designs, as
well as along the lines employed in the Little Boy Hiroshima bomb.
1. Box tail fins2. Steel gun breech
4. Cordite (conventional) explosives
5. Uranium-235 "projectile", six rings (26 kg) in a thin can of
6. Baro sensing ports and manifold
7. Bomb casing wall
8. Arming and fusing equipment
9. Gun barrel, steel, around 10 cm diameter, 200 cm length
10. Arming wires
11. Tamper assembly, steel
12. Uranium-235 "target", two rings (38 kg)
13. Tamper/reflector assembly, tungsten carbide
14. Neutron initiator
15. Archie fuzing radar antennas
16. Recess for the boron safety plug (not shown) to be ejected into
position as controller of Nazi Party finances as well as of Hitler 's
estate would have given him control over yet another source of funding
for these projects, a source completely independent of the state.
It is in this total context both of Carter Hydride's meticulous
research, as well as of Bormann's own Rotes Haus plan for Nazi survival,
that we may place Bormann's 1945 establishment of a special SS
evacuation Kommando, an act that placed jurisdiction over the Ju-290
four engine and Ju-390 six-engine heavy-lift ultra long range air
transport of Luftwaffe Kampfgeschwader 200 under the direct
control of none other than SS General Hans Kammler. The intention is
clear: as much of the actual research files and equipment of the
Kammlerstab as could be evacuated from Germany for destinations unknown
was to be handled by Kammler personally. This special evacuation command
held these aircraft in readiness near Lower Silesia in late 1945. By
this point, Kammler's power, backed by the Reichsleiter himself,
was so great that he could refuse a request by Reichsfuhrer SS
Himmler for the use of one of these aircraft.
Kammler, "with such aircraft at his disposal" would have been
able to fly a large cargo of "documents, personnel and technology pretty
much anywhere" that he wanted to. "Spain, South America - Argentina even
-would have represented no problem to such a long-range platform." 
Cook himself quips, "What was the point of chasing Kammler, if he'd
already shipped everything out?"
This revelation, coming late in the story of research into Nazi
secret weapons and the Nazi UFO legend, gives a clear indication that
more than just money, bullion, gems, art treasures or personnel were
involved in Bormann's survival plan. Clearly, Bormann meant to preserve
and continue the research already under way in the Reich by
transplanting the technology and continuing its development elsewhere,
either under independent Nazi control - as the various "survival"
myths maintain - or under
19. Nick Cook, The Hunt for Zero Point, pp. 186-187, 199.
20. Ibid., p. 199.
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